We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and ef®ciency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive, market clearing, price. Given positive search costs, ef®ciency obtains iff bargaining satis®es Hosios' condition and r 0. When prices are set by third-party market makers, however, we show that search equilibrium is necessarily ef®cient.
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
The starting point for the analysis of economic exchange is the frictionless theory of competitive, market clearing, supply and demand. The purposes of the approach are to identify the determinants of trade¯ows and to illuminate the social role of exchange. Although this standard paradigm is a very powerful tool, there are many questions on which it sheds little light. For example, what is the process by which equilibrium prices are reached? Why does it appear that some markets, say those for labor services or housing, fail to clear? Are the claims of the theory robust to relaxation of the assumptions of perfect information and zero transactions cost? These are some of the issues that recent studies in search equilibrium have attempted to answer. The purpose of this article is to consolidate and extend some results on price determination and allocative ef®ciency from this literature.
Consider the model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) . In their setup, there are many homogeneous buyers and many homogeneous sellers. Each buyer wants to acquire a single unit of an indivisible good in exchange for some amount of a perfectly divisible good, and each seller has one unit of the indivisible good for sale. Agents meet bilaterally and at random according to a simple matching technology, and trade when mutually agreeable at prices given by a simple bargaining rule. Rubinstein and Wolinsky characterize equilibrium and ask whether the outcome converges to a benchmark they regard as the analog of the competitive (Walrasian, market clearing) outcome, as the rate of time preference r goes to 0. Although there are some issues about whether they adopted the right benchmark, there is no doubt that they are asking the right question: is the frictionless competitive outcome of the standard model the limit of equilibria in well-speci®ed models with explicit frictions when these frictions get small? Gale (1987) clari®es the benchmark one should regard as the analog to the competitive outcome and analyzes a generalized version of the model where there are perpetual potential in¯ows of new buyers and sellers. He maintains a very particular matching technology and bargaining solution but allows agents to be heterogeneous: different buyers (sellers) can have different valuations (costs), and each must choose whether or not to enter the market. There are typically many prices in equilibrium, depending on the buyer and seller in a given transaction. However, Gale shows that as r gets small all prices tend to a common limit (a law of one price); moreover, this limit is market clearing in the sense that it equates demand and supply in terms of the¯ows of entering buyers and sellers. We extend these results by showing that such a law of one price holds when r tends to 0, even when there are strictly positive search costs, for any constant returns to scale matching technology, and for a generalized bargaining rule.
These extensions are interesting for the following reasons: First, we show that having positive search costs means that for all r below some threshold r b 0, every meeting will result in trade (when search costs are 0 we can only guarantee this in the limit when r 0). This makes the analysis relatively tractable and allows us not only to derive limiting results but to characterize the outcome rather completely, for any r` r. In particular, we can easily describe the price dispersion that arises for small but positive r. Second, we want to discuss ef®ciency, and of course, market clearing in the classical sense is not the same as ef®ciency when time and resources are required by the transactions process. Search equilibria are generally inef®cient, as has been known since Diamond (1981) and Mortensen (1982) . However, we also know from Hosios (1990) that as long as the matching technology exhibits constant returns to scale, if the bargaining rule is set just right (in terms of the matching technology) then the outcome will be ef®cient, at least if agents on two sides of the market are, respectively, identical.
Therefore, in order to investigate whether similar ef®ciency results hold here, we extend the Rubinstein±Wolinsky±Gale environment to allow a generalized matching technology and bargaining rule. Basically, the Hosios condition says that in order to maximize the aggregate gains from trade, less transaction costs, the traders' bargaining shares must re¯ect their marginal contribution to the value of the aggregate transaction¯ow. This condition is satis®ed in the case of a linearly homogeneous matching technology if and only if agents' shares equal the elasticities of the matching function with respect to the stocks of buyers and sellers in the market. So in our 2 model, just like the Hosios model, there is always a bargaining rule for which search equilibria are ef®cient. Of course, if one regards the bargaining rule as a primitive, then there is little reason to expect that in general it will satisfy Hosios' condition.
Nevertheless, Moen (1997) and Shimer (1995) have shown that there is a generalized competitive version of the search equilibrium framework that does lead to ef®ciency. In our interpretation of the story, one can think of third-party market makers who set up submarkets and promise a price and expected waiting time for transactions to any agents that show up. This allows buyers and sellers with different trade-offs between waiting time and price to select into appropriate submarkets. In what we call a competitive search equilibrium, each trader optimally selects a submarket, all submarkets that can attract traders are open, and all submarkets clear in the sense that they equate the in¯ow of participating buyers and sellers to the transaction¯ow. Since all gains from trade are exploited, competitive search equilibria are Pareto optimal and vice versa. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium price in each submarket can be interpreted as the outcome of bilateral bargaining where the shares satisfy the Hosios condition.
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The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic search equilibrium framework, discusses existence and uniqueness, and derives the limiting law of one price. Also, price dispersion is discussed for the case when r is strictly positive but below some threshold, and a version of the Hosios condition for ef®ciency is derived. Section 3 considers competitive search equilibrium and also derives existence, uniqueness, and ef®ciency results. Section 4 presents some brief concluding comments.
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2.1. The Basic Model. Each buyer demands one unit of an indivisible good and is willing to pay for it using another, perfectly divisible, good only if the price p is less than his valuation or demand price, x. Each seller supplies one unit of the indivisible good only if the price exceeds his cost or supply price, y. Once a buyer buys or a seller sells, he leaves the market. To maintain a steady state, there is also an in¯ow of new participants. The potential in¯ow of buyers is b, and each entrant has a demand price drawn from a continuous distribution with c.d.f. Fx; it is a potential in¯ow because some buyers (presumably, those with low x) may choose not to enter. Similarly, the potential in¯ow of sellers is s, and each has a supply price drawn from a continuous distribution with c.d.f. Gy. The set of buyer types is given by x, x ` and the set of seller types by y, y `, where we assume x b y, since otherwise the market would obviously shut down. 3 2 One interpretation of competitive search equilibrium is that which allows search to be directed, in the sense that buyers and sellers get to choose where they go, which sorts them into appropriate submarkets. Each submarket operates like the basic search equilibrium model. In the more basic model, by contrast, search is undirected. See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett et al. (2001 ), or Julien et al. (2000 , e.g., for discussions of the directed search approach and other references. 3 The assumption of continuous distributions of types F and G is a simpli®cation that permits the use of differential methods. All the results can be extended to the case in which the distributions are discrete, given the appropriate technical ®xes.
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Potential trading partners meet at an aggregate¯ow rate determined by a Pissarides (1990) style matching function MB, S, where B and S are the stocks of buyers and sellers currently in the market. We assume that M is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one. The buyer±seller ratio BaS, often referred to as market tightness, is denoted h. Given that matches are determined at random, the arrival rate for a seller (the rate at which he meets buyers) is MB, SaS Mh, 1, which we denote mh. Similarly, the arrival rate for a buyer (the rate at which he meets sellers) is MB, SaB mhah. The expected duration of time spent waiting for a match for any agent is the inverse of his arrival rate. A common exponential rate of time preference r is assumed. There is also an out-of-pocket transaction or search cost per unit time, denoted c b for each buyer and c s for each seller. These search costs, plus the fact that meetings take time and agents discount, constitute the frictions in our environment.
As in Gale (1987) , let p Ã and q Ã denote the competitive equilibrium price and quantity:
They are competitive in the sense that they are market clearing: the ®rst equality equates the¯ow into the market of buyers to that of sellers, and these in¯ows equal the out¯ow, or the quantity transacted q Ã , in steady state. However, the terms of trade in our market are not generally given by (1) but are naturally determined by bilateral bargaining. While there are a variety of ways in which to proceed, we assume here that when a buyer and seller meet, one of the two, chosen at random, announces a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. Let b be the probability the seller makes the offer. If an offer is rejected, the agents part and continue searching as though they never met; if the offer is accepted, exchange occurs and they exit the market.
In fact, here this bargaining protocol is equivalent to the generalized Nash solution. To see this, let V b x be the value function from participating in the market for a buyer with demand price x and let V s y be the analog for a seller with supply price y. A take-it-or-leave-it price offer p is acceptable to buyer x if and only if x À p ! V b x, and is acceptable to seller y if and only if p À y ! V s y. Given complete information, the optimal strategy of any agent choosing the price is to offer the other party's reservation value; i.e., p b y y V s y when the buyer sets the price knowing that the seller is of type y and p s x x À V b x when the seller sets the price knowing that the buyer is of type x. The expected price in a transaction between buyer x and seller y is given by pxY y bp s x 1 À bp b y. Inserting p s x x À V b x and p b y y V s y and rearranging, we have
Hence, one can interpret the outcome as the generalized Nash solution to bargaining over the joint trade surplus, x À y À V b x À V s y, where b is the bargaining power of the seller and the threat points are given by V b x and V s y.
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Given px, y, we can describe payoffs and the set of agents who enter the market as follows: The expected value of participation for a buyer with valuation x in steady state solves
where Cy is the distribution of seller types in the market, which, in general, differs from the exogenous distribution of potential entrants Gy since not everyone necessarily enters. Analogously, for a seller with cost y,
where Ux is the distribution of buyer types in the market. Inserting the bargaining solution (2) into (3) and (4), we have
One can easily verify that V b x is increasing and V s y decreasing. Hence, only buyers with x ! R b and sellers with y R s enter the market, where
The pair R b Y R s identi®es the marginal participating types.
We now derive the steady-state conditions. First note that in any meeting, exchange takes place if and only if the gain from trade is no less than the sum of the values of continued search, x À y ! V b x V s y. Hence, for buyers with x ! R b , we can equate the¯ow into the market and the¯ow out to get
where Iz is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if z ! 0 and 0 otherwise.
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Of course, for buyers with x`R b , who never enter the market, the steady-state condition is dUx 0. Similarly, for sellers with y R s , we have
and for sellers with y b R s , we have dCy 0.
Integrating both sides of (8) 
5 The¯ow in is bdFx since dFx is the density of potential entrants, and hence the density of actual entrants for all x ! R b . To compute the¯ow out, note that there are BdUx type x buyers in the market in steady state, they meet sellers at rate mhah, and a meeting results in exchange with probability given by the integral.
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Similarly, intergrating (9) over y, R s h i yields
Since Bmhah Smh MSY B, (10) and (11) imply
This simply says that the total¯ow of buyers into the market equals the total¯ow of sellers into the market, and both equal the total¯ow out of the market.
A (steady-state) search equilibrium can now be de®ned in terms of the marginal participating types R b , R s , the stocks of buyers and sellers in the market B, S, and the distribution functions over types in the market Ux, Cy, satisfying the participation conditions in (7) and steady-state conditions in (12), (8), and (9). Other variables, such as the price function px, y or market tightness h, which are also implicitly part of an equilibrium, can easily be recovered from the above conditions. In general, the existence problem involves ®nding a ®xed point in the space of distribution functions Ux, Cy. Rather than dwell on the technicalities required to establish a general existence result, we focus in the sequel on the relatively simple case that arises when r is small.
2.2.
The Law of One Price: r 0. In the limiting case when r 3 0 the left-hand side of (5) does not depend on x, and so neither does the right-hand side. This means that x À V b x k for some k that is independent of x for everyone in the market. In particular, for the marginal participating buyer, we have R b À V b R b k, and since V b R b 0 we know k R b . A symmetric argument applies to sellers. Hence,
Substituting these into (5) and (6), given r 0, we have
This implies that R b b R s as long as c b b 0 and c s b 0. As a consequence the gains from trade exceed the sum of the values of continued search for every participating pair:
Therefore, at least in the limiting case where r 3 0, every meeting results in trade. 
where K c b h c s amh.
Although we give a more general existence result below, it is worth ®rst discussing the issue when things are relatively simple. First, (18) de®nes an increasing relationship while (16) de®nes a decreasing relationship between R b and R s , as seen in Figure 1 . Hence, there is at most one pair R b , R s solving these conditions. As is clear from the ®gure, if K 0, there is a solution R b R s R, where y`R`x (given our maintained assumption y`x); this means that a positive measure of agents enters on both sides of the market, and so we say the market is active, or open. Indeed, for all K`x À y there exists a solution with R b`x and R s b y, but as soon as K exceeds x À y there is no solution with R b`x and R s b y, and the market shuts down. To understand the role of K, suppose we ®x the ratio c s ac b , which means h is Therefore, in the limit as r 3 0 the price actually does not depend on the types in the meeting x, y. This generalizes the result found by Gale (1987) , who derives this limiting law of one price for b 1a2, c b c s 0 , and a special matching technology. The equilibrium with r 3 0 is illustrated in Figure 2 . As in the standard supply and demand diagram, the vertical axis represents price p; the horizontal is quantity q; the curve DD is the graph of the inverse demand function, which in our case is F À1 1 À qab; and the curve SS is the graph of the inverse supply function, which is G À1 qas. The competitive market clearing price±quantity pair p Ã , q Ã occurs at the intersection of the two curves.
In search equilibrium the transaction¯ow q MB, S sGR s b1 À FR b is the value of q such that the vertical difference between the DD and SS curves equals c b h c s amh, since this is what R b À R s must equal by (15). As seen in Figure 2 , the competitive market clearing price p Ã is necessarily bracketed by R s and R b . The search equilibrium price p bR b 1 À bR s is a simple average of these values. Consequently, as the participation costs c b and c s vanish holding their ratio constant, since R s and R b converge to the same limit R, we see that p, q converges to the competitive market clearing pair p Ã , q Ã . We conclude that when frictions become small in the sense that r, c b , and c s vanish, the search equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive outcome. Note that this is independent of relative bargaining power, as re¯ected in the value of b. 7 2.3. Price Dispersion: r b 0. As mentioned above, when c b , c s b 0, it follows from (15) that every meeting results in exchange for all r below some threshold r, and not only in the limit at r 3 0. Given r is strictly positive and less than r, the outcome is still relatively easy to characterize and is interesting precisely because the law of one price does not hold. To describe the outcome, begin by rewriting the value functions in (5) and (6) as follows:
Substitution of (20) into (2) yields
Hence, price increases with the buyer's desire for the good, x, and with the seller's cost of production, y.
The next thing to do is to ®nd the value of the threshold r below which all meetings result in trade. To this end, begin by substituting from (20) back into (5) and rearranging to get
Using the steady-state condition dCy dGyaGR s , we have
Similarly, substituting from (20) back into (6) and rearranging, we have
These two equations together with the market clearing condition (16) determine h, R b , R s . A unique solution exists if r, c b , and c s are small enough, as we detail in Proposition 3.
7 Furthermore, the steady-state ratio of the stock of buyers to the stock of sellers in the market waiting to trade tends to 0 as the market structure tends to monopsony (b 3 1) and to I as the market structure tends to monopsony (b 3 0); hence, one can say that the relative number of traders on the two sides of the market is determined by bargaining power, rather than vice versa. 8 To derive V b x, differentiate (5) to get V H b x 1 À bmarh 1 À bm, which is constant, so V b x is linear. Using V b R b 0, we can determine the intercept. A similar argument yields V s y.
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Given an equilibrium exists, we know that every meeting results in exchange if and only if x À y À V b x À V s y ! 0 for all participants in the market, i.e., for all x ! R b and y R s . It is straightforward to verify using (20) that this holds if and only if R b ! R s . Hence, the critical r is that for which R b R s . However, R b R s means that their common value is the competitive price p Ã , since p Ã is bracketed by R b and R s , where p Ã can be regarded as a parameter here since it depends only on the exogenous components b, s, F, and G. Inserting R b R s p Ã into (22) and (23), we solve each equation for r and then equate the solutions. The result is
given the assumption of both buyer and seller diversity. Also, by assumption, mh is increasing and strictly concave and hamh 3 0 as h 3 0. These facts imply that the right-hand side of (24) is strictly increasing in h and equals zero at h 0, while the right-hand side of (25) is strictly decreasing and converges to in®nity as h 3 0. Consequently, there exists a unique solution h b 0 to the second equality; this is the unique value for market tightness such that the market clearing condition (16) holds when R b R s p Ã . Finally, associated with h we get the critical discount rate r from (24). In summary, all meetings result in trade if and only if r` r where r b 0 as long as c b Y c s b 0, and even though we have price dispersion the model is still quite tractable because of the fact that every meeting results in trade. 9 2.4. Ef®ciency. We have seen that search equilibrium is approximately market clearing when frictions are small, for any value of the bargaining power parameter b. However, it has been understood since Diamond (1981) and Mortensen (1982) that search equilibria are not generally ef®cient. The reason is that a trader's welfare is inversely related to the time required to make an exchange, except in the limiting 9 Note that p Ã P x, x y, y implies x
as the support of the distribution of buyer types collapses to a point, and similarly
as seller dispersion vanishes. Hence, r 3 I in either case. In other words, if either all buyers are identical or all sellers are identical, then all meetings result in trade for any value of r.
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case of zero frictions, and these waiting times depend nontrivially on the behavior of other agents. Although inef®ciency characterizes search equilibrium for an arbitrary b, when the matching function is homogeneous of degree one and all buyers and sellers are, respectively, identical, Hosios (1990) shows that a social optimum is achieved if b is set equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to sellers. For this value of b the two search externalitiesÐthe congestion effect imposed by every other agent on the same side of the market and the thick market effect attributable to the participation of agents on the other sideÐexactly offset.
In the case of a zero discount rate and a linear homogeneous matching function, it is easy to see that Hosios' result also holds here even though we have heterogeneous traders. One can think of the social planner as choosing the best among the set of search equilibria parameterized by b.
10 Given the assumption of linear preferences, the appropriate welfare criterion is the steady-state gains from trade realized by buyers and sellers, less the¯ow search cost, per period. In other words, the planner's problem is
subject to conditions that R b , R s and B, S satisfy the above equilibrium conditions and the price p is given by (19). Note that the integral in (26) is consumer plus producer surplus over all values of q out to the equilibrium trade¯ow q MB, S. As total search cost satis®es
by virtue of the homogeneity of the matching function and the equilibrium condition (18), the optimal choice of b is that which maximizes aggregate surplus net of transactions cost, indicated by the shaded area in Figure 2 . But maximizing the shaded area is equivalent to minimizing the search cost incurred by both parties per trade, equal in equilibrium to the difference R b À R s . As the necessary and suf®cient condition is
a comparison with (17) veri®es that the optimal choice of the seller's share parameter is uniquely determined by the Hosios condition
2.5. Three Results. Here we summarize the main results of this section.
PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 1 (EXISTENCE XISTENCE AND AND UNIQUENESS NIQUENESS).
Given c bY c s b 0, a unique steady-state search equilibrium exists for all r P 0, r with the property that every participating buyer±seller pair trades when they meet, where r satis®es (24).
PROOF ROOF. Basically, we need to generalize the argument behind Figure 1 to the case r b 0. Under the hypothesis r r, every participating buyer±seller pair trades because R b ! R s by construction. Then an equilibrium can be characterized by the triple h, R b Y R s that satis®es equations (16), (22), and (23). By (16), R s is a decreasing function of R b ,
Using this to eliminate R s in (22) and (23), one obtains
The right-hand side of either equation is strictly increasing in R b . The left-hand side of the ®rst equation is strictly increasing while the right-hand side of the second is strictly decreasing in h. Hence the ®rst equation de®nes a strictly increasing relation between the two variables while the second de®nes a strictly decreasing relation. Therefore, if a nonnegative solution R b , h exists, it is unique. The ®nal step is to show that there is a positive solution. Since R b ! R s we have consequently, R b ! p Ã ! R s qR b by the de®nition of p Ã , where p Ã b 0. Hence, the solution for h must lie between h L , de®ned as the solution to the ®rst equation when R b p Ã R s , and h H , de®ned as the solution to the second equation when
As the right-hand side of both equations is positive, by assumption, so are h L and h H . Consequently, there is a positive solution for h. j PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 2 (THE HE LAW AW OF OF ONE NE PRICE RICE). Consider any sequence of search equilibria de®ned by a sequence of strictly positive triples r, c b, c s converging to 0, 0, 0. The expected price of an exchange between any participating pair px, y converges to the competitive equilibrium price p Ã in the limit.
PROOF ROOF. As the triple r, c b, c s b 0 tends to zero, it is clear from the above discussion that R b and R s converge to each other (independent of the order of limits), and their common limit is p Ã . Hence, the result is implied by taking the limit in (21) . j (28). j
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Although Proposition 3 says that search equilibrium is ef®cient when the gains from trade are split in a particular way, there is no reason to expect that bilateral bargaining should necessarily deliver the correct outcome. That is, if the bargaining solution is taken as a primitive, equilibria will not generally be ef®cient. However, Moen (1997) and Shimer (1995) demonstrate that Hosios' condition does obtain in extended formulations of the model in which price offers and waiting times are known prior to the matching process. Here we interpret their equilibrium construct as a complete market equilibrium in which the expected duration until a trade is executed will be implicitly priced, and extend the result to the case of heterogeneity on both sides of the market.
Because search externalities are internalized in this competitive formulation of search equilibrium, participation and sorting of buyers and sellers into a collection of submarkets that offer different expected waiting times are Pareto ef®cient and, conversely, any Pareto ef®cient solution to the participation and sorting problem can be interpreted as a competitive search equilibrium. In the case of a zero rate of discount, the competitive search equilibrium is the search equilibrium with shares that satisfy the Hosios condition. More generally, the equilibrium pricing across submarkets can be formally interpreted as the particular bilateral bargaining outcome in each submarket for which the Hosios condition holds. Finally, we will show that there is only one competitive search equilibrium for all positive suf®ciently small rates of discount, and that equilibrium necessarily maximizes the aggregate values of buyer and seller participation.
3.1. The Basic Model. Imagine that each trader gets to choose to participate in one of a collection H of submarkets. In each submarket, buyers and sellers meet randomly at rates determined by the number of agents who participate. Since the meeting rates, mh for sellers and mhah for buyers, are uniquely determined by market tightness h in a submarket, the set of submarkets H is the set of distinct values for the market-tightness parameter offered by the market. Differences in trading prices across the submarkets, given by the endogenous price function p X H 3`, implicitly price differences in expected waiting times. So each submarket is characterized by a pair p, h, and each participating trader selects the most preferred submarket taking this price function and the set of submarkets as given.
An equilibrium price function is market clearing if the steady-state number of participating buyers and sellers in each submarket adjusts to equate the¯ow of buyers and sellers into each submarket with the transactions out¯ow. That is, taking p, h as given, buyers and sellers participate in suf®cient numbers to generate the 13 SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM correct value of h endogenously in this submarket. The equilibrium set of markets H satis®es two conditions: (i) each submarket is open, in the sense that it is the preferred choice of some buyer and some seller type; and (ii) markets are complete, in the sense that there is no other potential submarket p, h that would be preferred by a buyer and seller pair to any of those that are open.
Every meeting in a submarket results in trade. Hence, (3) and (4) Given this, we can formalize our openness and completeness conditions as follows. When we say that each market in H is open, we mean that it attracts some buyers and sellers: V h P H Wx, y P R b , x Â y, R s such that h arg max U b x, ph, h arg max U s y, ph, h (36)
When we say H is complete we mean there is no possible submarket that is not open but is strictly preferred by some buyers and sellers: we cannot ®nd a h j P H, a p P y, x, and a pair xY y P xY x Â yY y such that
and U s yY pY h b V s y (37) One way to interpret these conditions is to invoke the existence of third-party market makers with a pro®t motive who can set up submarkets. If there are positive 14 but suf®ciently small costs of opening a submarket, anything that failed to attract participants would not exist, while those that could attract both buyers and sellers from existing markets would be created. 11 In any case, a competitive search equilibrium is a pair of marginal participant types R s , R b , an assignment c b x, hY c s y, h, a set H, and a price function p X H 3` that satisfy (32)±(37).
3.2. The Equilibrium Price Function. In the above formulation, the set of steady-state equilibrium competitive assignments is equivalent to the set of Pareto ef®cient assignments of buyers and sellers to submarkets. Speci®cally, in h, p space, buyers and sellers have indifference curves along which U b x, p, h and U s y, p, h are constants, with marginal rates of substitution given by dp dh U b hm H h À mh rx À p c b mh rh mh (38) dp dh
Us
Àm H h rp À y c s mh r mh (39)
